This would be a legitimate and perhaps interesting application of an
external IDS, but automated correlation is still relatively unexplored
territory. I suspect that few organizations that actually do a CBA
conclude this is a priority allocation of time, talent and technology.
To your observation about "seeking professional help": I imagine that
any organization that would insist on such alarms *and* insist that IT
staff actually investigate/attend would experience sufficiently high
staff attrition rates to cause them to reconsider.
Carson Gaspar wrote:
Dave Piscitello wrote:
Kaas, David D wrote:
How many companies have an IPS/deep-packet-inspection device between the
firewall and the border router?
I honestly don't see a lot of this and unless there's a specific DOS
prevention issue, I don't see a lot of point in policing traffic that I
expect my firewall to block.
Back when I still did security for a living, I was a supporter of having
an IDS device between your border router and your external firewall.
However it was not for the reasons most folks might think. I wanted the
external IDS in logging-only (no alarms) mode, purely for forensic and
legal purposes. When we saw something funky on our internal/DMZ nets, we
could look at the external logs to see if it was part of an attack pattern.
Of course there is a cost/benefit analysis that has to be done to
determine if the data mining is worth the cost of the device.
I agree that anyone who has alarms enabled from an outside-the-firewall
IDS probably ought to go see a professional about their paranoia issues...
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